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COPYRIGHT FOR COUTURE 
LONI SCHUTTE1 
ABSTRACT 
Fashion design in America has never been covered by the 
extensive intellectual property (IP) protections afforded to other 
categories of creative works or to the art in other countries.  As 
a result, America has become a safe haven for design pirates.  
Piracy disproportionately harms young designers who do not 
have established trademarks for their brands and must rely 
purely on creativity to propel their designs into the market.  H.R. 
2511 is a bill that aims to extend copyright protection to fashion 
designs, albeit narrowly.  Compared with previous proposals to 
extend effective IP protection to fashion design, H.R. 2511 is 
more of a sui generis protection aimed at the particularities of 
the fashion industry.  It was the result of intensive negotiations 
between parties of conflicting interests, and has been tailored to 
address specific yet ubiquitous problems in the fashion industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Under current U.S. law, intellectual property (IP) protection 
for fashion designs is effectively nonexistent, creating a safe haven 
for design pirates.  Trade secret protection is impossible to 
maintain because fashion designs are necessarily public.2  Design 
patents are available, but are time-consuming and expensive to 
file.3  While trademark and trade dress protections are available,4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected, 2012; University of Arizona 
College of Engineering, B.S. in Chemical Engineering.  I am very grateful for 
the help of Professor Jennifer Jenkins, Professor Susan Scafidi, Professor David 
2 See Email from Susan Scafidi, Professor & Academic Director of the Fashion 
Law Institute, Fordham Law School, to author (Nov. 11, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
3 Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for 
Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 531, 554–59 (1999), http://llr.lls.edu/volumes/v32-issue2/frenkel.pdf. 
4 Trademarks protect the “mark” on a product but not the product’s 
comprehensive design.  While this aspect of the law is typically a significant 
limitation on design protection, it may prove to be effective in the segment of 
the fashion industry comprised of designs containing logos that completely 
cover the product, such as Louis Vuitton purses and Coach shoes.  Susan Scafidi, 
Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 121 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006) [hereinafter Scafidi I]. 
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both are inaccessible to young designers who are the future of the 
industry.  It requires significant expenditures of time and resources 
to establish secondary meaning in the marketplace—a prerequisite 
for trademark or trade dress protection of fashion designs.5  
Because young designers are often strapped for both time and 
money, their designs—the lifeblood of fashion—are particularly 
susceptible to victimization by design pirates.6   
¶2 “Pirates” include counterfeiters and copyists,7 both of 
whom tarnish an original design by creating low-quality replicas, 
reducing the potential profits made from the original.8  The 
availability and successful sale of replicas can cause the 
cancellations of entire purchase orders, which are particularly 
detrimental for young designers who cannot rely on established 
trademarks to propel their products into the market.9  Additionally, 
copyright protection is available only for aspects of a design that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 E.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213–16 (2000). 
6 Id. 
7 A copyist uses a replicated design, whereas a counterfeiter uses a replicated 
trademark or trade name.  Legal action is currently available against 
counterfeiters in the U.S., but is not similarly available against copyists. 
8 Profits could be reduced via tarnishment when a buyer sees a cheap version of 
a product and decides not to buy the original because others may think it is 
cheap, or a buyer sees the cheap version and actually buys the cheap version 
instead of the original.  See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The 
Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
21–23 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Hearings] (statement of Narciso Rodriguez, 
Designer on Behalf of the Council of Fashion Designers of America) (noting his 
frustration with the copy and sale of his designs before he could profit from 
them); Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a 
Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
305, 308–09 (2007) (“[D]esigners at all levels of renown have seen their designs 
replicated by large companies before originals even make it onto the retail 
market.”).  
9 See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Historical Regression, 
COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Mar. 10, 2008, 11:28 PM), 
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2008/03/design_piracy_prohibtion_act_h.php 
(“[B]ig companies have grown wealthy by copying small-scale creative 
designers . . . .”); see generally Christopher Muther, If The Shoes Fit, They’ll 
Copy It, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2010 (noting that starving artists are 
protected from knock-off art but emerging designers are not protected from 
knock-offs; allowing copies of emerging designers creations to be sold by 
copyists at a cheaper price reducing or eliminating their profit from the creation). 
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are conceptually separable.10  Thus, a simple iron-on graphic on a 
T-shirt would be eligible for more copyright protection than an 
elaborately designed ball gown.11  The limited availability of IP 
protection disproportionately harms young designers and is 
ineffective at protecting an industry with a fast-paced, cyclical 
nature.   
¶3 There is a long history of designers and their proponents 
lobbying for legislation to solve the problems prevalent in the 
American fashion industry.  The newest bill attempting to remedy 
these problems is the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy 
Prevention Act (IDPPPA),12 which was the end result of long 
negotiations between parties with conflicting interests. 
¶4 This iBrief will examine the American fashion industry in 
Part I, including (i) arguments by proponents of increased IP 
protection for fashion designs and (ii) arguments by the opponents 
of such a change.  In Parts II and III, it will examine the history of 
proposed legislation in America.  The iBrief will then review bills 
proposed in the 111th Congress, which evolved into the Innovative 
Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA)—a narrow 
piece of legislation aiming to remedy specific problems ubiquitous 
in the fashion industry.   
I. THE WORLD OF AMERICAN FASHION 
A. The Fashion Industry 
¶5 The fashion industry saw exponential growth toward the 
end of the 19th Century.13  This expansion was made possible with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The “conceptual separability doctrine” allows copyright protection for a work 
of art that is functional as long as the “art” can be conceptually separated from 
any functional aspects that the product may have.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 
(1954). 
11 A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 5055 before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 79 (2006) (statement of Susan Scafidi, Visiting 
Professor, Fordham Law School; Associate Professor, Southern Methodist 
University) [hereinafter 2006 Hearings]. 
12 First introduced as S. 3728 and reintroduced as H.R. 2511. 
13 See Fashion, WIKIPEDIA, (last modified Feb. 15, 2011, 5:23 PM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashion. 
2011	   DUKE	  LAW	  &	  TECHNOLOGY	  REVIEW	   No.	  011	  	  
	   4	  
the invention of the sewing machine,14 which made mass 
production and dissemination of clothing feasible.15  The fashion 
industry’s continued growth has resulted in a booming 
international industry, with a combined GDP of over $1 trillion per 
year.16 
¶6 Fashion products are separated into 3–4 categories depicted 
by the pyramid below.17   
	  
Figure 1: Fashion products pyramid18 	  
¶7 The top category is composed of high-end luxury designs, 
or haute couture, which is sold at a premium price.19  Also 
included in this category are bridge lines, produced by the same 
couture designers, but at a cheaper price.20  The middle tier is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 French tailor Barthelemy Thimonnier created the first practical sewing 
machine in 1830.  WILLIAM J. ROBERTS, FRANCE: A REFERENCE GUIDE FROM 
THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 576 (2004). 
15 See generally DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS 
PRODUCTION, 1800–1932 (1984) (discussing American factories that developed 
from 1800 to 1932). 
16 GUILLERMO C. JIMENEZ & BARBARA KOLSUN, FASHION LAW 6 (2010) (citing 
Michael Flanagan, How Retailers Source Apparel, JUST-STYLE (Jan. 2005)). 
17 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (2006) 
[hereinafter Piracy Paradox I]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.; JIMENEZ & KOLSUN, supra note 16, at 13. 
20 Piracy Paradox I, supra note 17, at 1694. 
!"#$%&"'"($)!&*+",-.//01 22324356671895:1)+1
1694 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 92:16871
 
 !"#$%&'($ )*%+,-#-.%/") ")%012'*".%3)45,%6%"
/'77'*'
1#
 .%8'49"*%:4,"*; 
 
!"#$%&'()*"+%,"+-$+-   .%&'(-$#%/$(*0+%,)'+0$ 
12$--$#3%&'()*"+%4$5056%
7++e%89$*+6%2'+'+'%
:$;<=9*,6%7++%>'?9"#@
2'(*,%'+/%,"AA"/*-?%';;'#$9%4$5056%
B9/%C'D?6%E'9!'#-6%>'#0$-@
F$((%&'()*"+%,"+-$+-.% 
(9"G$#%/$(*0+%,)'+0$ 
F$'(-%&'()*"+%,"+-$+-.% 
(9"G$(-%/$(*0+%,)'+0$ 
H#*,$ 
<1"=#,%4"*,(%+,-#-.% >2?)1") 012'*".%
3@/.%8:%8'49"*%:4,"*; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 
 
One difference between the categories is price; it generally in-
creases as one ascends the pyramid.11 The more important distinc-
tion, for our purposes, is the amount of fashion content, or design 
work, put into a garment. App r l in the designer categories (cou-
ture, designer ready-to-wear, and bridge) is characterized by higher 
design content and faster design turnover. Generally, apparel in 
the “bett r” and basic categories contain less design content and 
experience slower design change.12
Many fashion design firms operate at multiple levels of the 
pyramid. For example, Giorgio Armani produces couture apparel, 
a premium ready-to-wear collection marketed via its Giorgio Ar-
mani label, differentiated bridge lines marketed via its Armani 
Collezioni and Emporio Armani brands, and  “better clothing” 
line distributed in shopping malls via its Armani Exchange brand. 
 
11 The borders between product categories are indistinct. Some designers’ bridge 
lines market apparel as expensive as that found in others’ premium lines. In addition, 
particular forms of apparel (for example, jeans) appear in several categories. 
12 We do not offer a precise definition of “design content” but our basic point is un-
objectionable: clothing available from major fashion houses, such as Prada, contains 
more design innovation, generally speaking, than that from commodity retailers such 
as Old Navy. While Old Navy does produce new collections on a regular basis, the 
differences between old and new are, generally, smaller than the differences between 
Prada’s Spring 2005 and Spring 2006 collections, for example. 
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composed of ready-to-wear, moderately priced designs, and the 
bottom of the pyramid covers basic necessities and fast-fashion 
chains like Forever 21 and Wal-Mart.21 
¶8 The production and sale of fashion involves five phases: (1) 
design of the fashion apparel or accessory, (2) production of raw 
materials, (3) production of the designs, (4) advertising or 
promotions, and (5) retail sales.22   Each of these five stages are 
interrelated and necessary for the successful creation of seasonal 
lines or product development.23  Development of new lines occurs 
between four and six times per year, and couture collections are 
shown in New York, London, Milan, and Paris.24  Because new 
fashion products are in a constant state of development and each 
phase of development is resource-intensive, the fashion industry is 
exceptionally fast-paced.25  The question of whether IP protection 
can encourage more innovation and confer economic benefits, 
given the industry’s uniqueness, is a subject of constant debate.    
B. No Copyright for Fashion Design 
¶9 The most persuasive theory in opposition to the protection 
of fashion designs is known as the “Piracy Paradox.”26  The Piracy 
Paradox argument asserts that copying actually promotes 
innovation in the fashion industry by making a trend immediately 
accessible to a large group of people.27  Rapid reproduction and 
dissemination of designs cause the trend to lose its prestige and 
become undesirable.28  The consequent decrease in demand forces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Id.; JIMENEZ & KOLSUN, supra note 16, at 13. 
22 See, e.g., JIMENEZ & KOLSUN, supra note 16, at 13–15 (discussing the phases 
of product development of a design); Fashion, WIKIPEDIA (last modified Feb. 15, 
2011, 5:23 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashion (describing the fashion 
industry in four levels by combining design and production). 
23 See JIMENEZ & KOLSUN, supra note 16, at 14–15. 
24 Designers’ seasonal lines are always produced in Spring and Fall.  Most 
designers also have collections for Summer, Transitional Fall, Resort, and 
Holiday.  Id. at 15. 
25 See id. at 15–16. 
26 Piracy Paradox I, supra note 17; Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The 
Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009) [hereinafter Piracy 
Paradox II]. 
27 Piracy Paradox I, supra note 17, at 1719–32. 
28 Id. 
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designers to produce new designs quickly,29 thus promoting more 
innovation.30  The support for this theory primarily lies in the fact 
that the U.S. fashion industry has thrived thus far without 
copyright protection of designs—there is no need to fix a system 
that is not broken.31  
C. Fashion Designers Need Copyright Protection 
¶10 Congress has the power and the duty “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts . . . .”32  In the fashion industry, 
“progress” is “hindered by the lack of legal protection . . . .”33  
Proponents of copyright protection for fashion design argue that 
design piracy in the United States is rampant and harmful. 
Copyright can remedy the incentive problem by discouraging 
blatant copying and encouraging the production of creative 
designs.34      
¶11 Before the technology era, designers could rely on speed 
and secrecy to maintain the exclusive dissemination of their 
designs.35  Now, given the speed at which copyists can access 
designs through the Internet, designers no longer have that natural 
lead-time.36  Pictures of designs are taken from the runway at 
fashion shows and instantly emailed to offshore manufacturers 
who create identical copies, which sometimes reach the markets 
before the original.37 American designers are discouraged from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See id. at 1719–32, 1776 (discussing the argument that copying promotes 
innovation). 
30 Under this theory, an analogous argument can be made that derivative rights 
should never be given to a copyright owner of any type, because it would 
incentivize the copyright owner to create derivatives as fast as possible to 
prevent others from creating such derivatives.  The music and film industries 
would not be pleased by this argument.  See id. (discussing the argument 
regarding innovation from copying in the context of the fashion industry). 
31 See Piracy Paradox II, supra note 26, at 1213 (noting the U.S. fashion 
industry does not need protection because it is successful despite the fact that it 
has never had protection). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
33 2006 Hearings, supra note 11, at 82 (statement of Susan Scafidi). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 81–82. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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creating new designs that will inevitably be copied and likely sold 
before the designers have time to profit from their creations.38 
¶12  Although it is conceded that trends often develop through 
inspiration and creation of derivative works, copying line-by-line39 
is harmful to the industry.40  Line-by-line copying allows 
counterfeiters to circumvent U.S. Customs by manufacturing a 
copied design abroad and placing a label on the copied design after 
it enters the United States.41  Some argue that fast-fashion chains, 
which typically sell line-by-line copies, benefit the public by 
providing desirable designs at lower prices,42 but many fast-
fashion chains can provide more affordable clothing without line-
by-line copying.43  Reputable fast-fashion chains create adaptations 
of current trends, and are able to do so at a lower cost because they 
typically require less-costly raw materials and labor.44  
¶13 Whom does the ability to copy really benefit?  Many 
industry leaders assert that it merely benefits the copyists and 
counterfeiters who circumvent trademark laws and “reap where 
they have not sown.”45  They maintain that the alleged benefit of 
the “piracy paradox” is inconsistent with common sense—if 
designers were not allowed to make exact replicas of a design, then 
they would be forced to make innovative derivatives resembling 
the trend rather than copying it, thus resulting in a wider variety of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See 2008 Hearings, supra note 8, at 21 (testimony of Narciso Rodriguez, 
Designer on Behalf of the Council of Fashion Designers of America) (noting 
that copyists profit from his designs and expressing frustration over the fact that 
replicas arrive in the market before his designs are released in stores). 
39 Line-by-line copying of fashion designs is virtually the same as line-by-line 
copying of books—copying the design identically.  See Scafidi I, supra note 4, 
at 83. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 C.f. Piracy Paradox I, supra note 17, at 1714–28 (noting the benefits of being 
able to manufacture cheaper designs). 
43 See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law Culture, and Economics of 
Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1172–73 (2009) (differentiating between fast-
fashion chains that avoid close-copying like Zara and chains that copy line-by-
line like Forever 21—both are low-cost clothing retailers). 
44 See id. at 1172–74 (noting the lower cost of fast-fashion retailers, even those 
that do not copy line-by-line by creating adaptations of designs).  See also 
Piracy Paradox I, supra note 17, at 1693–95 (noting the cheaper raw materials 
that fast-fashion chains are able to use). 
45 2006 Hearings, supra note 11, at 83. 
2011	   DUKE	  LAW	  &	  TECHNOLOGY	  REVIEW	   No.	  011	  	  
	   8	  
trendy designs.46  Copying is actually chilling innovation and 
progress.  Additionally, industry leaders are concerned that it is 
harming smaller designers the most.  Small designers do not have 
established names to back their designs, and their works are often 
copied, reducing profits necessary for them to stay in business and 
create new designs.47  
II. EARLY APPROACHES TO FASHION DESIGN PROTECTION  
A. Legislative, Judicial and Industry Actions from 1900 to 2000  
¶14 As America developed, statutory protections were granted 
for original works by authors and inventors, but never included 
fashion designers within the scope of such protection.48  By the late 
1800s, complex fashion design legislation was enacted in Europe,49 
but the United States excluded fashion designs from protectable 
subject matter under the Copyright Act of 1909.50  This disparity in 
design protection gave European and other foreign fashion 
designers reason to be wary of selling their designs in the United 
States.51  Congress partly addressed this problem in 1913 when it 
passed the Kahn Act to persuade European designers to participate 
in the International Exhibition hosted in the United States.52  The 
Kahn Act protected European designers against American design 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Copycats vs. Copyrights, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 2010 
(discussing A.B.S. by Allen Schwartz who regularly copies gowns worn by 
celebrities and designed by couture designers). 
47 2006 Hearings, supra note 11, at 82–83 (statement of Susan Scafidi).  Young 
designers have a lot of trouble with others copying them and not having the 
funds to fight, even with regard to their trademarks.  See also Lauren Sherman, 
Bird Handbags is Now Called Liz Carey Handbars, Thanks to Juicy Couture’s 
Legal Department, FASHIONISTA (July 2010), 
http://fashionista.com/2010/06/follow-up-bird-handbags-is-now-called-liz-
carey-handbags-thanks-to-juicy-coutures-legal-department/#comment-58452368.  
48 Scafidi I, supra note 4, at 118 (noting that the pattern followed in the music 
and publishing industries started as piracy and is now heavily protected by 
intellectual property). 
49 This legislation was a consequence of the newfound popularity of haute 
couture and the permeation of design piracy.  Id. at 117. 
50 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (noting explicitly that dress designs are 
not protected under the Act as long as the design is not separable from the 
functionality of the dress). 
51 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1913–1914 156 (1915). 
52 Id. 
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piracy if the designers sent works to the International Exhibition.53  
That same year, a bill was introduced to create a new “design 
patent law”54 recognizing “prima facie” validity for designs upon 
deposit of formal papers to the Patent Office and without an 
expensive and time-consuming examination process.55  This 
fashion design bill was one of many that were never enacted.56 
¶15 In the face of Congress’s failure to pass protective 
legislation,57 the fashion industry took extralegal action by 
establishing the Fashion Originators Guild of America in 1932.58  
The Guild’s members made agreements among themselves to sell 
exclusively to stores that did not sell copies of members’ designs.  
However, the Federal Trade Commission filed suit and the United 
States Supreme Court held that the guild’s actions violated 
antitrust laws.59    
¶16 In the 1950s, the Court stepped in once more, but to assist 
designers by applying the doctrine of “conceptual separability.”60  
This doctrine allows functional “works of artistic craftsmanship,” 
including clothing designs, to be copyrightable as long as the 
artistic form is independent of its function or utility.61  Given the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Id. at 156, 177–78. 
54 Patent Law to Protect Designs: Features of Bill Whose Passage By Congress 
Will Be Urged When It Meets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1915), 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=FA0B10FB385B17738DDDAA0894D8415B858DF1D3. 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., Rocky Schmidt, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design 
Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 861, 865 n.30 (1983) (citing 74 design bills from 
1907 until 1983).  Out of these proposed bills, the 1926 Vestal Bill was the most 
successful.  It passed the House in 1930 and sat in the Senate until Congress 
adjourned the following year.  See generally Maurice A. Weikart, Design Piracy, 
19 IND. L.J. 235 (1944); The Vestal Bill for the Copyright Registration of 
Designs, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 477 (1931). 
57 See Schmidt, supra note 56, at 865 n.30 (citing 74 design bills, 22 of which 
were introduced prior to 1934, and the establishment of the Fashion Originators 
Guild); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 800 n.12, Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (citing 71 design protection bills from 
1914 until 1979). 
58 Id.; Scafidi I, supra note 4. 
59 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
60 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
61 Id. 
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difficulty of separating functionality from design elements, this 
doctrine has provided very narrow protection.62   
¶17 When ruling on egregious design copying cases, judges 
have expressed regret over the lack of protections, but believed 
that deciding in favor of the designer would encroach on 
Congress’s legislative power.63  However, Congress did not rectify 
the problem recognized by the courts—the bills proposed in the 
following decades were never passed.64 
B. Why Fashion Design Bills Failed 
¶18 The fashion design bills introduced in the 20th Century 
failed for a number of reasons, both cultural and political.  There 
was a lack of information about how the industry functioned65 and 
Congress failed to grasp the unique qualities of fashion that should 
have been the basis for a sui generis right—different from the 
rights provided through either copyright or patent law.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In a hearing contemplating a new fashion design legislation protecting fashion 
through copyright, William Fryer noted that the Doctrine of Separability 
requirement “pretty much eliminates copyright protection.”  2008 Hearings, 
supra note 8, at 7 (testimony of William Fryer III, Professor of Law, University 
of Baltimore School of Law). 
63 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280–81 (2d Cir. 1929) 
(describing the injustice of a competitor copying, undercutting, and profiting 
from a designer’s silk pattern).  In his opinion, Judge Learned Hand explained 
that, although it may seem that “plaintiff had suffered a grievance for which 
there should be a remedy, perhaps by an amendment of the Copyright Law . . . , 
[j]udges have only limited power to amend the law . . . . [E]ven though there be 
a hiatus in completed justice . . . , whether [other interests] prove paramount we 
have no means of saying; it is not for us to decide, [but for Congress].”). 
64 See e.g., H.R. 2223, 94th Cong. (1975); S. 1361, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 1774, 
91st Cong. (1969); H.R. 6124, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 1237, 89th Cong. (1965); 
H.R. 5523, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 9870, 86th Cong. (1960); S. 2075, 86th 
Cong. (1959); H.R. 8873, 85th Cong. (1957).  See also Schmidt, supra note 56, 
at 861 n.30 (1983) (citing 74 design bills, 28 of which were proposed between 
1950 and 1983). 
65 See 2006 Hearings, supra note 11, at 79 (statement of Susan Scafidi). 
66 There is an argument to be made, outside the scope of this article, that IP 
protection for fashion designs is increasingly gaining support from Congress in 
the 21st Century because more females occupy legislative and powerful 
professional positions—females who understand the fashion industry better than 
do their male counterparts.  Interview with David Lange, Professor of Law, 
Duke Law Sch., in Durham, N.C. (Nov. 3, 2010). 
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¶19 Early fashion design bills seemed to borrow language from 
patent laws.67  Apparel was treated as purely utilitarian or 
functional, similar to patentable products.  Although there is a 
functional component to clothing, creativity and originality became 
the primary focus of clothing companies—more analogous to 
copyright subject matter.68  But, as the industry developed to center 
on creativity, Congress’s understanding of fashion designs did not 
evolve with it.    Moreover, pure copyright laws raised concerns 
when applied to the fashion industry as characterized by the 
proponents of extending protection for designs.69 
III. LEGISLATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
A. Bills Proposed From 2006 to 2009 
¶20 Fashion design legislation was again proposed in both the 
109th Congress70 and 110th Congress.71  The bill introduced in the 
109th Congress, H.R. 5055, contained a definition of fashion 
design limited to “the appearance as a whole of an article of 
apparel, including its ornamentation.”72  The bill, reintroduced in 
the 110th Congress as S. 1957, narrowed the scope of protection 
by rejecting the “substantially similar” standard used to determine 
infringement in most copyright cases, responding to a concern that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See, e.g., S. 6925, 64th Cong. § 3 (1916) (on file with author) (referring the 
bill to the patent committee and proposing protection for designs that meet a 
novelty requirement—similar to that for patents).  The cyclical and fast-
changing nature of the fashion industry makes patent laws ill-suited to protect 
designs, and the language in design bills gradually adapted to more 
appropriately resemble copyright law.  Compare S. 6925 (requiring originality 
and novelty for protection), with H.R. 5523, 88th Cong. § 1–2 (1963) (requiring 
originality, but not novelty for protection).  
68 2006 Hearings, supra note 11, at 79. 
69 Id. at 79 (statement of Susan Scafidi).  Problematic copyright provisions for 
fashion designs include the extended length of copyright protection and the 
substantial similarity standard.  See generally supra Part I.   
70 H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006). 
71 H.R. 2033 and S. 1957 were introduced in the 110th Congress by 
Representative Delahunt and  Senator Schumer, respectively.  Both H.R. 2033 
and S. 1957 are substantively identical with the exception that S. 1957 has a 
different definition of infringement when applied to fashion designs.  Compare 
H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2007), with S. 1957, 110th Cong. § 2(d)(2) 
(2007). 
72 H.R. 5055 § 2(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
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the standard was too subjective for the fashion industry.73  Instead, 
it defined infringement as “[not] original and [sic] closely and 
substantially similar in overall visual appearance.”74  Trends are 
often created through derivatives of designs, and applying a pure 
copyright standard to fashion works would be more harmful than 
beneficial.75  Still, the proposed standard in S. 1957 was not 
narrow enough to appease the earlier bill’s critics.76 
B. 2008 Hearings 
¶21 The 2008 congressional hearings were a response to the 
failures of prior bills and the reintroduction of the fashion design 
bill in the 110th Congress as H.R. 2033.77  Critics continued to 
grapple with the subjectivity of substantial similarity in the context 
of the fashion industry and were troubled by unclear rules, the 
potential for frivolous litigation, protection of truly original 
designs versus harming designers who draw upon trends for 
inspiration, and the logistical difficulties of design registration.78 
C.  Why These Bills Failed 
¶22 The bills failed in their attempts to narrow the definitions of 
infringement and of fashion design, which remained vague and 
difficult to apply.  The “substantially similar” standard was 
inapplicable to the industry because of the inherent need for 
derivative works in trend development.79  Narrowing “substantially 
similar” to “[not] original and closely and substantially similar” 
was not tailored enough to allow for the creation of valuable 
derivative works.  These proposed tests for infringement concerned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 2008 Hearings, supra note 8, at 81–82 (statement by Kevin M. Burke, 
President & CEO of Am. Apparel & Footwear Ass’n). 
74 S. 1957 § 2(d)(2)(C) (emphasis added).  
75 2008 Hearings, supra note 8, at 81–82 (statement by Kevin M. Burke, 
President & CEO of Am. Apparel & Footwear Ass’n). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 81–82. 
79 See Piracy Paradox I, supra note 17, at 1719–32 (explaining how creating 
trends is a result of dissemination of a popular design that is propelled by 
copying).  
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honest designers and retailers who created derivative designs as 
their primary business.80   
IV. THE “NEW” BILLS 
A. 111th Congress: DPPA & IDPPPA 
¶23 Representative Delahunt introduced the Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act (DPPA) on April 30, 2009,81 which was 
significantly amended and reintroduced by Senator Schumer as the 
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA 
or S. 3728) on August 5, 2010.82  Both bills proposed amendments 
to Chapter 13 of Title 17, which would extend limited copyright 
protection to fashion designs.83  One such limitation was the 
proposed period of protection, which was to last only three years.84 
¶24 The DPPA differed from the IDPPPA in several ways.  
There were differences among the bills’ definitions of protectable 
fashion designs, requirements for registration and a searchable 
database, criteria for infringement, and exceptions.  The changes 
from the DPPA to the IDPPPA were a result of extensive 
discussions and negotiations.85 
i. Definition 
¶25 The definition of a protectable fashion design in the DPPA 
is broader in scope than in the IDPPPA.  The definition in the 
earlier bill is 
(A) [sic] the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, 
including its ornamentation; and 
(B) includes original elements of the article of apparel or the 
original arrangement or placement of original or non-original 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See, e.g., 2008 Hearings, supra note 7, at 94 (statement of Bryan P. Collins, 
President of The Topline Corporation) (noting the use of foreign designs for 
creative inspiration). 
81 Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA), H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009). 
82 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA), S. 3728, 
111th Cong. (2010).  Reintroduced as H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011). 
83 156 CONG. REC. S6,882–83 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010). 
84 H.R. 2196 § 2(d); S. 3728 § 2(d). 
85 See 169 CONG. REC. S6,893–94 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010); Susan Scafidi, 
IDPPPA: Introducing the Innovative Design Protection and Privacy Prevention 
Act, a.k.a. Fashion Copyright, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://counterfeitchic.com/2010/08/introducing-the-innovative-design-
protection-and-piracy-prevention-act.html. 
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elements as incorporated in the overall appearance of the article of 
apparel.86 
This definition is modified in the IDPPPA with the addition of two 
further requirements for copyright protection.  The original 
elements of the design must be “the result of a designer’s own 
creative endeavor,” and the design must “provide a unique, 
distinguishable, non-trivial, and non-utilitarian variation over prior 
designs for similar type of articles.”87  This limitation allows 
honest designers and retailers who create derivative designs to 
continue their business as long as the design contains legally 
significant variation.  The IDPPPA will likely encourage 
innovation by protecting designs from exact replication by copyists 
and counterfeiters, while permitting creation of derivatives—
increasing the variety of designs for any given trend.88    
ii. Registration Requirements 
¶26 The DPPA required registration of fashion designs in a 
searchable database89 within six months of making such designs 
public.90  The IDPPPA, on the other hand, had no registration 
requirement, but did include a heightened pleading requirement 
similar to that of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.91  These requirements were driven by different 
underlying policies.  The DPPA intended to provide notice 
regarding a design’s copyright status, while the IDPPPA addressed 
the concern that a registration requirement would be a huge burden 
on fashion designers in a fast-paced and cyclical industry.  New 
and smaller designers would be at a particular disadvantage 
because they would tend to lack the resources to register every 
design.92  One common feature worth noting, however, was the 
increased penalty for false representations subsequent to 
registration of a design copyright.93  This penalty would discourage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 H.R. 2196 § 2(a)(2)(B). 
87 S. 3728 § 2(a)(2)(B). 
88 See, e.g., 2008 Hearings, supra note 8, at 94 (statement of Bryan P. Collins, 
President of The Topline Corp.) (noting the use of foreign designs for creative 
inspiration). 
89 Compare H.R. 2196 § 2(j)(1), with S. 3728 (no database requirement). 
90 H.R. 2196 § 2(f)(1). 
91 Compare S. 3728 § 2(g)(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
92 Scafidi I, supra note 4, at 121. 
93 Compare S. 3728 § 2(h), with H.R. 2196 § 2(h). 
2011	   DUKE	  LAW	  &	  TECHNOLOGY	  REVIEW	   No.	  011	  	  
	   15	  
frivolous lawsuits and make designers wary of filing suit if a 
design is not “substantially identical.” 
iii. Infringement and Exceptions 
¶27 Both bills provide a narrower definition of infringement 
than that which applies to book authors, music artists, and other 
creators of copyrightable work.  But, the later-proposed bill 
included several additional measures to appease interested parties. 
¶28 One notable exception added to the IDPPPA is the “Home-
Sewing Exception.”94  This exception allows a single copy of a 
fashion design to be made for personal use or use by an immediate 
family member, as long as the design was not offered for sale.95  
However, because this exception only allows for a single copy, it is 
hardly an exception at all.  It would arguably be appropriate to 
allow a person to produce multiple copies of a protected design for 
personal use or for the use of an immediate family member, as 
long as that copy is not offered for sale or use in trade during the 
period of protection.  Although the concession of a home-sewing 
exception is weak, the extremely narrow definition of infringement 
provided in the IDPPPA should compensate for it—allowing a 
person to reproduce designs with small derivations or 
modifications. 
¶29 Instead of merely requiring “substantial similarity” between 
the copyrighted and infringing articles,96 DPPA required the 
infringing article to be “closely and substantially similar in overall 
visual appearance,”97 while the IDPPPA required the infringing 
article to be “substantially identical in overall visual appearance.”98 
A “substantially identical” article of apparel is defined as that 
“which is so similar in appearance as to be likely to be mistaken 
for the protected design, and contains only those differences in 
construction or design which are merely trivial.”99  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 S. 3728 § 2(e)(3). 
95 Id. 
96 ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN 
COPYRIGHT L. § 1:1 (2010). 
97 H.R. 2196 § 2(e)(2).  Although “closely and substantially similar” is not 
defined in the DPPA, the wording implies that it is a standard that finds 
infringement if the alleged infringing product is slightly more than “substantially 
similar” to the original design.  See id. 
98 S. 3728 § 2(e)(2). 
99 S. 3728 § 2(a)(2)(B). 
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exceptionally narrow definition would allow the production of 
derivative works by other designers without infringement—a 
modification responding to the reality that copying trends is 
important in maintaining the cyclical and innovative activity of the 
fashion industry.100   
B.  Is It Time For Design Protection? 
¶30 Advances in technology have allowed mass production of 
copies and counterfeit goods.101  This activity has resulted in lost 
sales, lost brand revenue, and reduced incentives to invest in new 
designs.102  Although it is impracticable to reliably quantify the 
losses incurred by counterfeit goods, the problem is substantial as 
the estimated value of counterfeit goods is as high as $456 billion 
worldwide.103   
¶31 Young designers are already struggling to make their mark 
in the fashion industry, and they are especially harmed by copyists 
and counterfeiters.  Young designers currently have no effective 
means of protecting their products, through copyright or other IP 
protections, making them particularly vulnerable to copyists and 
counterfeiters.  The designers have seen substantial decreases in 
sales, and creative young minds are too easily put out of business.   
¶32 The IDPPPA, reintroduced with minor amendments as H.R. 
2511 in the 112th Congress, is a narrow bill that is well-tailored to 
the unique aspects of the fashion industry, largely satisfying the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See, e.g., Piracy Paradox II, supra note 26, at 1218–19 (noting that the 
substantial similarity standard used in most copyright cases would prohibit 
derivative designs and hinder trend-setting, but that line-by-line copying was not 
objectionable). 
101 C.f. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS OF 
COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf (noting that, between 2004 and 2009, 
the value and amount of U.S. seizures of counterfeit goods imported from 
foreign countries fluctuated—it could be inferred that counterfeit goods coming 
into the country fluctuated and it is likely that copied goods coming into the 
country also increased). 
102 See id. at 9. 
103 Id. at 19–28. Although this study targets counterfeit goods only, the value of 
designs lost to copyists would likely be similar because copied designs feed the 
counterfeit goods industry.  See Scafidi I, supra note 4, at 83. 
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concerns of both opponents and proponents of copyright protection 
for fashion designs.   
¶33 The proposed bill could provide a limited amount of 
copyright protection to boost talented young designers into the 
market.  The bill could provide young designers with enough 
protection to enter into license agreements with established firms 
before they use the young designers’ work.  In H.R. 2511, 
Congress has finally fashioned a copyright scheme that protects the 
most vulnerable designers and effectively addresses the conflicting 
interests in the industry. 
CONCLUSION 
¶34  The Internet era has exacerbated the problems present in 
the fashion industry, and the historical lack of legal protection has 
created a new industry based purely on counterfeiting and copying.  
American fashion designers are suffering from this counterfeit 
industry, and Congress is in the best position to remedy the 
problem.  The IDPPPA, or H.R. 2511, is focused on addressing the 
specific problems prevalent in the fashion industry.  It allows for 
limited protection of fashion designs while also aiming to protect 
honest designers and retailers within the industry whose primary 
business is the creation of derivative works.  If passed, the bill is 
likely to successfully foster a flourishing fashion industry in the 
United States. 
